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Chapter 2. Women, failure and the fear of loss 
The times when I have most felt that I am a failure have all 
arisen from the sense that I have failed as a woman. This 
feeling can be triggered by the asking of a seemingly innocent 
question: 
‘Do you have children?’ 
My heart sinks, I feel sick and I try to come up with an answer 
that doesn’t open up all the pain surrounding this unrealized 
aspect of my life. At other times, a less innocent version of 
this question is offered as a statement, usually accompanied 
by a sense of smug superiority from the person making it, who 
is, most often, a mother herself: 
‘I don’t think you can be fully a woman until you’ve had 
a child.’ 
It is very difficult to think of a response that doesn’t involve 
swearing or throwing something; though so far I have 
managed not to do either. I have, after all, been brought up 
properly and in England. Dinner parties would be much more 
exciting, I suppose, if I felt able to vent in this way. 
Exploring female success and failure does more, you’ll be glad 
to hear, than enable me to grapple with my own, deep-
rooted feelings of failure. It also makes possible an 
engagement with that which is so often caught up with the 
feelings of failure: loss. These questions about motherhood 
grip so fiercely at my heart because they remind me of the 
deepest loss of my life so far: not being able to have a child. In 
this chapter, I want to suggest that it is by tracking the 
specifically female forms of success and failure that we 
encounter the things that human beings (of whatever sex or 
gender) cannot control. 
The pursuit of success considered in the previous chapter 
acts as a powerful distraction from reflection on what it is to 
be a human being. Work and its ‘relentless activity’ makes it 
possible for us to ignore the forces which make human life 
precarious and unpredictable. Chuck Palahniuk in his novel 
Lullaby suggests that our society is particularly adept at 
distraction, peopled as it is by ‘sound-oholics’ and ‘quiet- 
ophobics’ (2003: 15). Noise drives out contemplation; 
busyness, the space for thinking. Yet the things we would 
ignore are as important – perhaps more important – than 
the things that are easy to talk about.1 What happens if we 
pay attention to the spectre of the failed life; that ghostly 
presence that hovers at the periphery of our dreams of 
success? Considering that which is pushed to the margins of 
life makes it possible to uncover the fears which haunt the 
desire to be a success. According to Paul Tillich, all human 
beings struggle with the anxiety that comes with being 
finite beings in a world of chance and change. Born into the 
world, dependent upon it, subject to death, the threat of 
non-existence (of non-being or not-being) is ever present.2 
This existential anxiety is felt in our fears of death, our 
sense of meaninglessness, our feelings of guilt. How do we 
cope with these feelings of anxiety? Tillich identifies one 
way of attaining an illusory form of control over the terror 
that comes with realizing that one day we will no longer 
exist: 
Anxiety strives to become fear, because fear can be met 
with courage. ([1952] 1977: 47) 
If anxiety is the dull ache in the pit of the stomach, the 
unease brought about by the shape at the corner of the 
eye that cannot quite be grasped, fear is something that 
can be contained, for it can be connected to specific 
objects that the individual is then in a position to confront. 
Fear is easier to confront than anxiety, and much easier to 
manage. 
How does this general existential anxiety get transformed 
into fears that can be confronted and contained? 
Consideration of the shaping of the idea of Woman reveals 
the way in which something habitually placed on the margins 
can be used to manage feelings of anxiety arising from the 
realization that we cannot always control our destinies. 
Historically, women’s bodies have played a particular role in 
this attempt to exert control over the uncontrollable. In 
tracking the specifically female forms of success and failure 
we come face- to face with the inescapable realities which are 
part and parcel of the experience of dependent, finite beings. 
If we are to live well, we will need to bring these realities out 
into the light, finding as a result ways of living with them. 
Women, success (and failure) and the 
feminization of work 
If I feel a failure as a woman, I might be expected to feel like a 
success when considering my place in the (supposedly) gender-
neutral world of work. I was awarded my PhD in my mid-20s, I 
was made a professor in my mid-40s and I have a nice 
collection of books I have written on my bookshelf. (All very 
pleasing and tangible, blissfully free of the ghosts of bad 
reviews, rejected articles and books I started but failed to 
complete.) 
If in previous ages I would have been excluded from the work   
of a philosopher because of my sex, today being a woman in 
the work place might even be seen as an advantage. Some of 
the major changes to the nature of work in contemporary 
Western societies have been construed as particularly 
beneficial for women. Work has become steadily less 
industrial, and while numbers working    in the traditional 
(male) manufacturing sectors have declined, the jobs 
requiring supposedly female skills have steadily increased. 
The expansion of the service sector, in particular – which 
includes hospitality, sales, shops and care work – would 
seem to put women in an advantageous position, not least 
because these jobs require skills women are assumed to 
have in abundance: caring, building relationships, paying 
attention to the needs of others.3 Describing this shift in 
working practices as ‘feminization’ suggests women will be 
the ones best placed to take advantage of the new jobs that 
emerge in a service-driven economy. If anyone seems to be 
failing in the world of work, presumably it will be men, as 
the kind of work associated with male physical strength is 
rapidly disappearing.4 
Against such a backdrop, we might expect women to be 
more successful than men. The situation is rather more 
complex, however, for the work reflecting supposedly 
female skills continues to be low paid, insecure and of low 
status. This is even the case in the cosy academic world I 
inhabit. As the philosopher and feminist activist Michèle Le 
Doeuff notes in her account of women’s entry into the 
university, ‘When a respected activity admits women it 
loses value’ ([1980] 1989: 110). And value means both its 
status and its pay.5 There may be more women in paid 
work, but ‘women’s work’ remains undervalued, even in 
those areas of life which once excluded but which now admit 
women.6 Understanding why the extension of female work 
might not mean women are more successful requires 
digging a little deeper into the shape of this changing 
workplace. 
What skills are needed to be a successful worker? As we saw 
in the previous chapter, what is valued in the contemporary 
workplace is the ability to shape yourself as a successful 
entrepreneur of yourself. You must be adaptable, able and 
willing to acquire the skills needed to be a success. In a 
‘feminized’ work place, it makes sense to assume that the 
worker – be they female or male – will need to play out the 
skills associated with the feminine if they are to achieve 
their goals. 
The notion that we perform gender is illuminated by the 
ideas of the critical theorist Judith Butler. For Butler, gender is 
not something innate, but always a form of performance.7 
Her approach develops Simone de Beauvoir’s claim that 
when we consider what it is to be a ‘woman’, we find a 
social construction which reflects society’s ideals of what it 
is to be female.8 As Beauvoir puts it, ‘One is not born, but 
rather one becomes, a woman’ ([1949] 1972: 295). In 
other words, I might be born with a set of female sex 
organs – breasts, vagina, womb, ovaries – but these do not 
by themselves make me ‘a woman’. I have to learn to act in 
accordance with the values my society associates with 
‘being a woman’. As I grow up, so I attempt to become a 
(more or less) successful version of what a woman is 
expected to be. 
Butler extends Beauvoir’s ideas to cover male as well as 
female experience. All gender identities are forms of 
performance. This enables a more complex rendition of what 
it means for the workplace to become ‘feminized’. The ideal 
worker in the post-industrial world is ‘one who can claim to 
possess a flexible or mobile relation to gender performance 
and hence to have taken up a reflexive stance towards 
gender’ (Adkins 2002: 58). This is less about being able to 
succeed because you are a woman; rather, it is about being 
flexible in the way you present yourself in the workplace. It is 
this flexibility that enables you to ‘become’ a success, not the 
mere fact that you are female. The values traditionally 
ascribed to femininity are now prized in the workplace, not 
the fact that you are a woman. 
The consumerist economics of neoliberalism affects what this 
means in practice. To be a success in the neoliberal world of 
work, I must pay attention to ‘appearance, image and style at 
work’; these three qualities are closely aligned to what Lisa 
Adkins calls ‘the aesthetics of the feminine’ (Adkins 2002: 
61). But this is not about women per se: for both women and 
men to be successful, they must perform this aesthetics.9 In 
practice, however, it is easier for men to ‘ “take on” the 
aesthetics of femininity, perform reversals and gender 
hybrids’ (Adkins 2002: 75). Men may even find it easier to 
take on the flexible forms of self-presentation required in 
order to be a success. For women, it may be far more difficult 
to perform the masculinity required in some work situations. 
Put simply, men can enact both masculinity and femininity, 
while women can only enact femininity. 
An example from the world of politics may help us. During 
the US Presidential campaign in 2016, any sign of 
weakness was taken to show that Hillary Clinton was not 
tough enough to be president. At the same time, her 
habitual wearing of the ‘pantsuit’ was seen by her 
opponents as a form of masculine presentation; and not in 
a good way. She was somehow less a woman by striving to 
be more like a man. By way of contrast, Donald Trump for 
all his weaknesses was seen to look more like a president 
than she did. It was easier for him to embody the masculinity 
believed by many to be necessary to become the president 
of the United States (POTUS) because he was male. 
Businesses expected to thrive on ‘high testosterone’, like 
the banking sector, raise similar problems for how women 
are to present themselves in the world of work. Social 
occasions used to cement connections with business 
associates are not always welcoming of women. Business 
women report finding it ‘demeaning to try to be one of the 
boys’ (Adkins 2002: 146). Being ‘a ladette’ doesn’t always 
work: as one woman working in finance comments, ‘You 
can’t go out and get ratted as one of the boys in the pub; it 
just won’t work’ (Adkins 2002: 154). In contexts where 
maleness is seen as an advantage, women have to decide 
whether to be ‘more or less female’, rather than ‘more or 
less male’.10 Far from ‘levelling the playing field’ for 
women to succeed, the playing out of gender might well 
be more advantageous for men than it is for women. 
A further aspect of women’s experience should be 
considered when exploring what is required to be a success 
rather than a failure. Here, a vista opens up into the things 
that haunt the constructions of success as attainment. 
Here, we get a glimpse of the anxieties accompanying the 
construction of failure. 
What does it mean to be successful as a woman? 
As I’ve suggested, this involves more than pursuing 
cultural measures of success as defined by the things you 
attain and achieve in the workplace. What it means to 
succeed as a woman is also shaped by a powerful set of 
social, historical and political norms where female success is 
conceived quite differently from that expected of the male. 
Let’s consider appearance and style, those features 
which are apparently as important for male success as for 
female success in a society shaped by consumerism. 
Appearance remains more important for women in a context 
where female beauty is more obviously prized. Here are a 
set of random and common images: the beautiful, young 
woman used to sell products as diverse as cars, washing 
powder and perfume; the craggy old businessman (or 
president) accompanied by the beautiful trophy wife; the 
habitual description of women – in whatever context – as 
primarily wives and mothers. When the UK MP Jo Cox was 
murdered by a right-wing extremist in 2016, her friend 
and fellow MP Rachel Reeves said in the debate to mark 
Cox’s life that ‘Batley and Spen will go on to elect a new 
MP, but they won’t replace a mother’. Reeves is right; but 
if Cox had been male, would this comment about her 
status as a parent have been made in quite this way? And 
here is another vision of what makes for a successful 
woman: when 71-year-old Manuela Carmena became 
mayor of Madrid in June 2015, taking up one of the most 
powerful positions in Spain, the media summed up her 
warm personality by calling her ‘the Hugging Grandma’. 
Women are never judged just by what they have done; they 
must also succeed at embodying a particular set of qualities 
associated with femininity. When Julia Gillard stood to be 
leader of the Australian Labor Party in 2005, she was 
photographed at her kitchen table, on which was placed an 
empty fruit bowl. This innocuous object was endowed with 
particular significance by her opponents. Gillard did not have 
children, and so her ‘fruit bowl’ was empty, a sign of her lack 
of femininity. She was ‘deliberately barren’. To run for high 
office and not to have children is, for a woman, a sign that 
something is not right.11 A similar criticism was directed at 
Theresa May during the Conservative Party leadership contest 
in July 2016. Another contender, Andrea Leadsom, drew 
attention to the fact that Mrs May did not have children. ‘She 
possibly has nieces, nephews, lots of people. But I have 
children who are going to have children who will directly be a 
part of what happens next’, Leadsom argued.12 Not having 
children lessens, it seems, the ability of a female politician to 
connect to the future. Rarely are men expected to show their 
fitness for government as something located in their ability to 
procreate. 
The shadow side of female success modelled as 
achievement and feminine appearance emerges from a 
survey taken in 2006. When questioned, 90 per cent of 
American women claimed they felt financially insecure, 
with nearly half the women surveyed expressing fear that 
they would become a bag lady, living on the streets, with no 
home, no security and no support. The language one 
woman used to describe her fears it revealing: ‘The inner 
bag lady, wrinkle-faced and unkempt, is no joke. She’s the 
worst-case-scenario future’ (Standing 2011: 108). 
This image of the bag lady provides a telling way into the 
anxieties masked by the claim that failure is always a result 
of your own actions. The fears expressed by this woman 
are not just about failing at work, becoming homeless and 
without resources: although given the lack of a welfare 
net to stop such an eventuality, this is far from a baseless 
set of fears for the majority of Americans. What is 
significant is the way this woman expresses her fears. She 
fears being ‘wrinkle-faced and unkempt’. This metaphor 
might be read as simply expressing her fears of losing the 
powers of femininity, so prized in the feminized 
workplace. Yet her description suggests something more 
and here we see an opening into Tillich’s existential anxiety. 
The failure this woman fears is connected to the 
experience of physical loss – ageing and the loss of bodily 
powers – common, of course, to all individuals, not just 
women. Yet in practice, there is a long history of the female 
body being used as a container for the anxieties which 
arise from the experience of being embodied beings 
subject to change. The body is never ‘just’ a physical 
entity: it is always shaped by social mores and values. By 
exploring success and failure through the concepts 
routinely played out on the female body, it is possible to 
discern powerful anxieties regarding loss running beneath 
cultural narratives of what it is to fail. 
Standing out from the world: The 
masculine roots of ‘human’ success 
As a young student, back in the days when dinosaurs roamed 
the earth, I remember being shocked as I realized the extent 
to which women’s voices were excluded from the Western 
philosophical tradition. It wasn’t just that there weren’t many 
(any) women philosophers referred to in my classes, it was 
that the way the world had been shaped reflected male ideas 
of what was required to live a fulfilling life. Being human was 
identified with the attributes of reason, choice and autonomy. 
Far from being ‘gender neutral’, however, these attributes 
reflect male experience of the world and have a particular 
bearing on the framing of success as attainment. 
Leonardo Da Vinci’s ‘Vitruvian Man’ provides a fitting 
illustration for the way in which ‘the human’ comes to be 
defined in Western discourse. Placed in a circle, arms and legs 
outstretched, Da Vinci’s image captures the Renaissance ideal 
of humanity. It is not just any old body that is placed at the 
centre: Da Vinci employs the male body as a mirror for the 
movements of the cosmos. All is to be understood through 
‘Man’s’  values and activities. While this idealized vision    of 
Man is offered as the exemplar of all that is human, the 
female body is notable by its absence. Man, not Woman, 
frames the world. Language, similarly, lends itself to a view of 
the world where ‘the human’ can be understood without the 
female. The male generic – ‘he’, ‘him’, ‘his’, ‘man’, ‘mankind’ 
– is habitually used to denote all human beings. ‘Woman’ is
an unnecessary extra, consigned to the margins of
experience. If Man is equatable with the Human, Woman is
subsumed in Man. The assumption that the male ‘includes’
the female allows attitudes gleaned from male experience of
the world to be taken as emblematic of all experience: an
habitual assumption not without impact on the way in which
success and failure are shaped.
Reflection on male psychosexual development and 
socialization suggests something of the way in which 
attainment becomes the marker for the successful life. 
According to psychoanalytic theory, identity is not a given, 
but something that has to be achieved.13 Identity is 
‘psychosexual’, and so bodily experience is significant for the 
development of mental processes. Early on in the 
development of this approach, Freud stressed the importance 
of sexual difference for understanding male and female 
psychic experience.14  While  we might resist the rigid 
structure this places on understandings   of gender (not least 
in light of the ideas of Judith Butler we have just considered), 
the physical differences between male and female and, 
importantly, the way in which social norms and values have 
been derived from these differences, cannot be so easily 
ignored.15 In psychoanalytic theory, it is the way in which 
these differences are interpreted that shapes and reflects 
specific social values and attitudes. In particular, it is the 
relationship to the mother’s body that makes the struggle 
involved in establishing one’s identity different for boy and girl. 
While the girl sees her identity reflected in her similarities with 
the maternal body, the establishment of male identity 
depends upon distinguishing the self from the mother. To be 
male is to ‘stand out from’ the mother’s body.16 If we accept 
this framing of maleness as an achievement rather than a 
given, it is not so surprising to find the institutions 
established historically by men reflecting (albeit it 
unconsciously) the belief that success is to be measured in 
terms of attainment. 
To accept this account of male sexual development is not to 
suggest that the struggle for female identity is any more 
straightforward. Freud’s account of female sexuality, for all 
the criticisms directed at it,17 recognizes the complexity of 
female psychosexual development. Far from being a static 
representation of what it is to ‘become’ a woman, Freud 
eventually settles on a position that sees a girl moving from 
identification with her mother, to identification with her 
father, before finding her ultimate resting place with the 
mother’s identity.18 Yet the role assigned to the mother 
assumes a different status for men than for women. In the 
terms of Freud’s argument, the girl will – or at least 
should19 – come to locate her identity with that of her 
mother. For the establishment of male identity, an 
alternative solution is required. The mother must be 
escaped if the male is to establish his masculine identity. D. 
H. Lawrence’s portrayal of a son’s desperate attempts to
escape the cloying clutches of his mother’s love in Sons and
Lovers (1913) offers a dramatic account of what is required
by male maturation. A relatively short step is needed to
arrive at the view that the female represents that which is
to be avoided in order to successfully achieve a male
identity.
The existentialist philosopher Jean-Paul Sartre may have 
rejected psychoanalytic theory out-of-hand, but he accepts 
the idea of identity as a form of achievement.20 To become a 
subject, to ‘stand out’ from the world, requires resisting the 
pull of the Other who would turn the developing individual 
into an object that could be controlled. This ‘Other’ who 
would trap the individual in the things of this world is 
illustrated by a variety of examples Sartre derives from the 
female body. Body parts associated with sexual desire are 
turned in Sartre’s writing into horrible reminders of the 
mutability of all flesh. He describes the Other as the full breasts 
of a woman, flattened out when she lies on her back.21 An 
innocuous representation, perhaps: not so the images he 
derives from female genitalia. Now, the oppressive Other is 
the ‘moist and feminine sucking’ that ‘draws me as the 
bottom of a precipice might draw me’ (Sartre [1943] 1969: 
609). The Other is ‘the obscenity of the feminine sex … which 
“gapes open” ’ (Sartre [1943] 1969: 613). I am reminded of 
the horror movie, Teeth (2007), where the ‘monster’ is a 
woman whose vagina bites off the penis of the man foolish 
enough to penetrate her. While not equipping his Other with 
teeth, Sartre describes this feminine threat as ‘a sweet, 
clinging, dependent threat to male freedom’ (Collins and 
Pierce 1980: 117). This feminine Other threatens to subsume 
the unwary individual in the things of the natural world which 
must be overcome in order to attain the status of a 
transcendent.22 
Success is the achievement of escaping the physical. 
Failure is to be trapped in the feminine world of 
material things 
Sartre is French, and so we might excuse his apparent sexism 
by accepting that he distinguishes the ‘feminine’ from the 
‘female’. However, his language betrays him. The examples he 
uses are derived from the realities of the female body: vagina, 
breasts, bodily secretions. Such is the problematic nature of 
this connection between Woman and body in Sartre’s 
existentialism that when Simone de Beauvoir shapes her own 
philosophy, built on his categories, she takes a largely 
negative stance to motherhood. To be a mother is to lessen 
the possibility of claiming one’s place as an individual 
‘standing out’ from the world.23 The conclusion to be derived 
from such comments seems to be that it is better for women 
to reject maternity in order that they might become fully 
creative human individuals. (Perhaps I should cite Simone next 
time someone tells me I can’t be a ‘proper’ woman if I don’t 
have children.) 
Of female success 
Beauvoir’s solution – while offering me a ready retort – 
isn’t, of course, very helpful. It fits all-too-neatly with a 
common view of female success: give up those qualities 
identified with the female, and become, as far as possible, 
the same as the male. When the successful life is modelled 
in this way, the experiences associated with the female 
body become forms of failure to be overcome, not just by 
manly men, but by women too. There may be good 
reasons for this radical, if unsatisfactory, solution: not least 
when we consider the history of philosophical suggestions 
which would demarcate the scope of female success. A 
remarkable consensus emerges when male philosophers 
turn their attention to defining Woman.24 And their vision 
suggests a distinct form of female success located in a set 
of physical attributes which are, in reality, doomed to fail. 
In the Western tradition, female success is consistently 
associated with the things of the body: beauty, sexuality, 
appearance and reproduction. A powerful expression of this 
idea is found in the writings of Immanuel Kant, Father of 
the European Enlightenment, whose ideals sit so closely 
with the neoliberal construction of selfhood: human beings 
are rational, free and capable of choice. Kant’s account of 
the complementarity of the sexes, written in 1764, endows 
each sex with a set of essential qualities. These qualities 
affect the goals set for men and women. Men are to strive 
for nobility, depth, reflectiveness, learning, profundity and 
principled action. Women, by way of contrast, are to be 
beautiful, charming companions. 
Male attributes require action: they are to be achieved. 
Female attributes require the woman to do nothing. As Kant 
sets about defining ‘the fairer sex’, he starts with those things 
with which a woman is born: ‘Her figure is generally finer [than 
man’s], her features more delicate and gentler’ ([1764] 1960: 
76). Emanating from such physical charms are a set of values 
appropriate to this ‘breeding’ which, presumably, any 
woman (given the right social conditions) could acquire: 
Her mien [is] more engaging and more expressive of 
friendliness, pleasantry, and kindness than in the male 
sex. (Kant [1764] 1960: 76) 
From an early age, she takes delight in dressing up, finding 
pleasure in ‘trivialities’ that make her happy.25 The image 
that springs to mind is that of the doomed French Queen, 
Marie Antoinette, who in one year had over 150 dresses 
made for her. Dresses don’t make an intellectual, and we 
might wonder at the attractions such a vain creature would 
have for the serious, thoughtful man who Kant thinks should 
accompany her. Helpfully, he addresses this problem, 
explaining that Woman exudes ‘a secret magic’ that inclines 
Man to look favourably upon her ([1764] 1960: 76). Taking 
such features as a whole, Kant concludes that Woman is 
known ‘by the mark of the beautiful’ ([1764] 1960: 76), while 
the male sex can ‘make a claim on the title of the noble sex’ 
([1764] 1960: 76). His language is revealing. Women bear the 
physical mark of ‘the beautiful’, while men must work to be 
called noble.26 To be a success as a woman is to be 
passive; to be a success as a male is to be active. To be 
successful as a woman requires doing nothing; to be 
successful as a male requires application. 
This affects the expectations placed on the sexes as they 
confront the difficulties of moral decision making. 
Woman’s moral decisions will reflect the sentimental 
connections she makes with others, for her moral 
inclinations result from her ‘many sympathetic sensations, 
goodheartedness and compassion’ (Kant [1764] 1960: 77). 
Male morality will be more robust, shaped by knowing 
where your duties lie and acting accordingly.27 There is 
nothing equal, though, about the values ascribed to male 
and female, for in practice it is the morality which accords 
with duty (and which Kant identifies with the male) that 
expresses the highest form of moral action.28 If moral 
action is based on feeling, it is quite possible that there will 
be circumstances in which you fail to feel sympathy for the 
other person, and as a result fail to act morally.29 I can 
relate to this. Walking through Oxford late at night, I 
probably feel less inclined to help someone begging than I 
might be at other times of the day. Feeling isn’t always a 
good way of shaping our moral commitments. 
For now, though, the important thing to consider is what 
all this means for women and how we are supposed to 
shape our lives. Kant’s duty-based morality is arrived at 
through using the intellect, not through extending your 
feelings, and this means that men, not women, are those 
most capable of the serious reflection necessary for 
arriving at the right moral positions. Here’s Kant’s 
conclusion: 
Deep meditation, and a long-sustained reflection are 
noble but difficult, and do not well befit a person in 
whom unconstrained charms should show nothing else 
than a beautiful nature. (Kant [1764] 1960: 78; my 
emphasis) 
The differences between the sexes lead to different 
moralities, but we should be in no doubt as to which 
morality is preferable: 
The virtue of a woman is a beautiful virtue. That of the 
male sex should be a noble virtue. Women will avoid the 
wicked not because it is unright, but because it is ugly. 
(Kant 1764: 81; his emphasis) 
Male morality is deep, female morality based on the surface 
of appearances. What does it mean to be a female success? It 
is   not the same as male success. Female success is denoted 
by the achievements of the body: desirability, sexuality, 
appearance and style. These are the very things that the 
successful male should avoid, or at least treat lightly. If ‘the 
principal object is that man should become more perfect as a 
man’, Kant’s goal for woman is different, for she is to become 
‘more perfect … as a wife’ (Kant [1764] 1960: 95). A woman 
who attempts to attain the things that denote male success 
(intellect and independently cultivating the life of the mind30) 
runs the risk not just of failure, but of failure as a woman. And 
Kant has damning words for the women of his day who have 
the audacity to attempt such things: 
A woman who has her head full of Greek, like Madame 
Dacier, or carries on fundamental controversies about 
mechanics, like the Marquise de Châtelet, might as well 
even have a beard. ([1764] 1960: 78) 
A woman’s ability to embody the beautiful is threatened if 
she dares to think: ‘Her philosophy is not to reason, but to 
sense’ (Kant [1764] 1960: 79). Female success is defined by the 
extent to which a woman aligns herself with the natural forces 
played out on her body: a process which suggests something 
of the luck that attends to being a successful woman in the 
terms which Kant sets out. But it also does more than that. It 
opens up a kind of failure that is inevitable, regardless of how 
beautiful or charming a woman is. 
A woman’s body and the virtues derived from it are 
subject to the ravages of time which ensure that even 
female success will turn to failure 
Arthur Schopenhauer is more explicit about woman’s failure 
than is Kant, who – rather chivalrously, perhaps – avoids this 
obvious conclusion. Schopenhauer’s jaundiced eye is on 
motherhood, which, far from being a form of success, he sees 
as merely revealing the weakness of women. (If he weren’t 
long dead, I might ask him to come with me to the next 
dinner party.) Where Kant is sentimental, Schopenhauer is 
ruthless. Here is his description of motherhood: 
She expiates the guilt of life not through activity but 
through suffering, through the pains of childbirth, 
caring for the child and subjection to the man. 
(Schopenhauer [1851] 1970: 80) 
Far from being a success, motherhood keeps women as 
infants.31 Their very childishness makes them fit only for 
the repetitive (and boring) task of playing with children. 
Schopenhauer is convinced that no man worth the name 
would be capable of bringing up children: 
One has only to watch a girl playing with a child, 
dancing and singing with it the whole day, and then ask 
oneself what, with the best will in the world, a man 
could do in her place. (Schopenhauer [1851] 1970: 81) 
Now, we might dismiss these reflections as mere misogyny. 
The form Schopenhauer’s attack takes, however, reveals a 
disquieting reality. Even when deemed most successful in 
the realm of ‘women’s work’, female success is ultimately 
viewed as a form of failure even by those men who construct 
it in this way. And Schopenhauer is highly effective at 
pointing out the transience of the things deemed necessary 
for the successful female life. Think what happens to 
physical beauty and the ability to have children: 
Nature has acted with its usual economy. For just as 
the female ant loses its wings after mating, since they 
are then superfluous, indeed harmful to the business of 
raising the family, so the woman 
usually loses her beauty after one or two childbeds, and 
probably for the same reason. (Schopenhauer [1851] 
1970: 81) 
Schopenhauer makes explicit what Kant’s romantic vision 
of the female ignores. Female virtues are transient, emerging 
from processes that render beauty and human relationships 
fragile and subject to loss. The peculiarly female form of 
success, located in physical beauty and the processes of 
reproduction, is doomed to failure. When the philosopher 
sets about ‘his’ quest for that which is eternal, it is not 
surprising to find him rejecting the female and the attributes 
associated with her. So Plato shapes the philosopher as one 
who must resist physical procreation in order to produce 
‘children of the mind’.32 The offspring women produce from 
their bodies are doomed to die. Only ideas – these ‘children 
of the mind’ – are truly eternal, truly capable of transcending 
mutable, fallible human flesh. Hence the person who is truly 
wise pursues only that which is eternal, and this necessitates 
putting aside the things which are merely transient. 
This might make me, a childless woman, feel better. It 
doesn’t. Rejecting procreation because it leads only to death 
reflects Plato’s broader disregard for the physical world 
itself.33 It also acts as a way of belittling the status of women. 
Despite arguing in the Republic Book V that men and women 
are capable of ruling (or at least they would be in his idealized 
society), a less optimistic destiny is given to Woman in Plato’s 
discussion of love in his Symposium. Here, love of women is 
described as something base. Such a love can only lead to 
that which is mortal; its ultimate goal is, after all, the 
production of children who are themselves destined to die. It 
is a love which cannot lead to the immortal values the 
philosopher seeks. These values can only be attained through 
the companionship of another male.34 Explicitly connected 
with the world of reproduction, the female body comes to be 
identified with mutability. Her body becomes a receptacle for 
forms of failure which are to be avoided. It cannot be allowed 
to stand as a model for the experiences which accompany all 
human lives, not just women’s. The failure of Woman, lived 
out in her flesh, meets the losses of embodied existence 
which are common to all experience. Yet rather than accept 
that loss is a fundamental part of all human experience, the 
female body is connected exclusively with the processes of 
change and, ultimately, decay. 
Even the successful female, it transpires, is a failure. 
The transience of the qualities viewed as fundamental to 
female success reflect a deep vein of misogyny within the 
Western tradition, for, as Schopenhauer’s vitriolic words 
suggest, Woman herself is an ontological failure: that is to 
say, she is a failure in her very being. It is not so much that a 
woman might fail to achieve in the same way as her male 
counterparts. Nor is it that any particular woman might not 
be able to embody the values of beauty and fertility ascribed 
to her by philosophers like Kant. Even if she is ‘successful’ 
on the terms they set, she is still doomed to be a failure 
because of the specific nature of female success. 
Plato’s pupil, Aristotle, makes this clear as he attempts to 
determine the processes of reproduction. According to his 
theory, the male is the sole source of life. The female 
‘merely’ provides the passive matter which the male 
principle shapes.35 So far, so passive. But Aristotle goes 
further. Because she lacks this active principle, Woman is 
‘as it were, a mutilated male’.36 Her very passivity reveals 
her failure: and it is a failure grounded in a fundamental 
lack of agency. When the medieval theologian Thomas 
Aquinas applies Aristotle to his theology, this failure is given 
a further (divine) twist. According to Aquinas, woman is a 
‘misbegotten male’ who can only find wholeness through 
relationship with the man from whom she was made.37 
‘Man’ is created in God’s image. And before we conclude 
that he must be using ‘Man’ in an inclusive way which 
describes both men and women, note how he employs the 
image of how Woman was made. Just as Eve was made 
from Adam’s rib in the creation story of Genesis 3, so all 
women are created in Man’s image. Man is closer to God 
than Woman, for only Man is made in God’s image.38 For 
Augustine, whose ideas also influenced Aquinas, it is in the 
mind that the image of God is to be found.39 Man is 
defined by godly reason, Woman by her participation in the 
body of Man.40 To be Woman is to lack something that 
only the male can provide. 
We might be unimpressed by this sojourn in the world of 
philosophy. Who cares what a bunch of philosophers from 
the dim and distant past think? It is not just philosophers 
who open up this world of female failure. Literary sources 
also expose the precarious nature of female success. In 
Tennessee Williams’s A Streetcar Named Desire, the ageing 
Southern Belle Blanche Dubois resorts to hiding in dimly lit 
rooms in order to persuade her lover that she is still young 
and beautiful. This strategy comes to a brutal end when he 
turns on the light in order to ‘look at you good and plain’ 
(Williams [1947] 1962: 203). If light destroys the illusion of 
Blanche’s beauty, in Emile Zola’s Nana it is small pox that 
destroys his heroine’s good looks. Zola makes plain just how 
fragile a thing female beauty is. The novel opens with Nana 
the theatrical sensation. She has no talent to speak of, 
cannot sing, nor can she deport herself on stage. But she is so 
beautiful that she is described as ‘Venus rising from the 
waves’ (Zola [1880] 1972: 44), a goddess who captivates her 
audience. The end of the novel cruelly turns this image on its 
head. ‘What lay on the pillow was a charnel-house, a heap of 
pus and blood, a shovelful of putrid flesh … Venus was 
decomposing’ ([1880] 1972: 470). 
Female success is precarious, and inevitably turns to failure. 
Woman’s very flesh means she can never succeed, because 
she  is too closely connected to the impermanent material of 
the natural world. When Aristotle and Aquinas claim this 
failure to be of her very being, they suggest that the male is 
somehow set apart from the corruption inherent in the 
physical realm. Human frailty is located in female flesh, and so 
it becomes possible to see the male as standing apart from the 
facts of mortality and the limitations of being human.41 
Making the male the embodiment of nobility, rationality, 
freedom and action allows scant regard to be paid to the fact 
that all human pride and achievement ultimately end up in the 
grave. By using the female body as a receptacle for the 
limitations of being physical, the male comes to enact an 
illusion of control over the limitations of loss and death. 
Failure, loss and the ageing female 
body 
And yet … 
There is no escaping the relentless march of Time. Women 
may age, but so too, of course, do men. A woman’s 
struggle with ageing is, however, never simply a matter of 
personal concern. Her changing body is greeted with levels 
of disgust, fear and repulsion rarely directed at the ageing 
male body. We need only consider the lack of male 
equivalents for terms like ‘crone’ or ‘hag’, ‘old bag’ or 
‘battle axe’, to realize that the ageing male is not subject to 
the same criticism as the ageing female. 
In the consumerism that drives neoliberal economics, the 
struggle with ageing takes on a particular shape. To create a 
market, it makes sense to identify an anxiety in your 
chosen client group, creating and marketing a product 
which provides a solution for that anxiety. The cosmetics 
industry is extremely successful at nurturing women’s fears 
of ageing. In 2015 alone, the US beauty and personal care 
business had a market value of $80 billion.42 For a 
working world that emphasizes the importance of 
appearance and style, it makes sense for the successful 
entrepreneur of the self – be they female, or, indeed, male 
– to pay attention to how they look. Yet as Barbara Walker
commented in the mid-1980s, the older man is not subject
to the same pressures as the older woman:
Women are socially and professionally handicapped by 
wrinkles and grey hair in a way that men are not. (Walker 
1985: 31) 
It is tempting to consign Walker’s comments to the dustbin of 
history: after all, they come from the 1980s. Surely we have 
moved beyond this kind of crude sexism? In practice, it is far 
from the case that the working world is less sexist than it was at 
the time when Walker was writing these words.43 Indeed, her 
comments have a particular resonance for those working in 
that most visual of domains, the world of broadcasting. In 
2011, the presenter of the BBC’s Countryfile programme, 
Miriam O’Reilly, took her employer to an employment 
tribunal after she was one of four female presenters – all in 
their 40s or 50s – dropped from the programme. While her case 
was upheld on the grounds of age discrimination, the tribunal 
rejected O’Reilly’s claim that she had been the victim of sex 
discrimination. Yet the numbers of older women broadcasters 
in the UK would seem to speak for themselves. In a report 
commissioned by Labour MP Harriet Harman in 2013, 5 per 
cent of TV presenters were found to be women over the age of 
50, while older men were found to outnumber older women by 
four to one. This isn’t to say that attempts aren’t being made 
to ensure that men feel just as insecure about their 
appearance in order to expand the market in cosmetic 
solutions to ageing. A recent advert in the United States had 
a daughter encouraging her father to use a hair colourant as 
he prepared for a job interview, so that he might look more 
youthful, and thus ‘more energetic’. While the pressure is on 
for men, women are far more likely to seek cosmetic solutions 
to the signs of ageing. A survey by the British Association of 
Aesthetic Plastic Surgeons found 91 per cent of cosmetic 
surgery patients in 2007 were women;44 a figure that 
remains remarkably static, and which was repeated in the 
Association’s survey of 2015. 
Cosmetic solutions hold out the promise of eternal youth: a 
promise that is gratefully grasped by many. Yet in practice, 
potions and procedures cannot forever hold back the 
passage of time. As Jacqueline Zita notes, the failure of these 
solutions contributes to the experience that to be female is to 
fail: ‘Because these attempted restorations of youth and 
beauty ultimately fail, it is women in the end who fail, and 
fall’ (Zita 1993: 105). The distinctive form of female success 
outlined by the philosophers, playwrights and novelists we 
have considered depends on youth. Physical beauty is 
equated with it, the ability to reproduce depends on it. And 
just as cosmetic procedures cannot succeed in holding back 
the years, so medical solutions offered to women attempting 
to conceive in later life are also unlikely to succeed.45 
When female success is defined through looks and 
motherhood, it is not surprising that ageing should pose a 
problem for women that goes beyond its construction as a 
marker of mortality. The introduction to a volume on 
women and ageing in film from the 1980s still resonates, 
some thirty years on: 
A woman’s greatest social prestige has long been 
associated with youth, an idealized attractiveness, and 
reproductive abilities; society offers few comforts or 
securities to the older woman who, through an 
inalterable physical process, no longer fits the ideal. 
(Stoddard 1983: 5) 
Representations of the ageing female body reveal more, 
however, than a simple marginalizing of the older woman. 
Advertisers routinely exclude older women from their 
campaigns. The adverts run by Dove Skincare and Marks & 
Spencers stand out as exceptions that prove the rule, 
consistently including – and celebrating – women aged 50 
and above. More often, the exclusion of women from film 
and broadcast media is accompanied by disgust if an older 
woman attempts to conform to the youthful ideal by which 
all women are judged, and then is found wanting. 
The rise of social media has amplified this disgust. In 2014, a 
‘Twitter storm’ accompanied suggestions that the actor 
Renee Zellweger had had plastic surgery.46 ‘Robert$chultz’ 
(@Bosssexy711) gives a flavour of this with a tweet posted 
on 17 January 2015: ‘Watching Renee Zellweger age is like 
watching the Titanic hit the iceberg in really slow motion.’ 
In 2016, photos of Zellweger, taken in ‘full sunlight’, and 
looking ‘like what you would expect a woman in her late 
40s  to look like’47, were published, sparking further 
comments on her ‘shocking’ appearance. The suggestion 
that Zellweger avoid bright sunlight implies that all women 
over 40 should adopt Blanche Dubois’s strategy, and dim the 
lights.48 
The disgust directed at the ageing woman tells us about more 
than the number of mean-spirited people inhabiting the 
Twittersphere. According to psychoanalyst and philosopher 
Julia Kristeva, disgust accompanies the presence of the 
abject. The abject is that which is perceived to be a threat to 
the integrity of the subject. It is that which has to be excluded 
from the subject, for it ‘draws me toward the place where 
meaning collapses’ (Kristeva 1982: 2). It suggests the failure of 
human attempts to stand out from the physical world, to 
escape the pull of the finite. Kristeva’s examples of the abject 
include those things which remind us most of our own mutable 
physicality: blood, the open wound, shit.49 These things we 
would rather hide are connected to that which lies behind 
their offensive qualities: Death, that ever-present reality which 
has the power to break in and destroy the comfort of both 
the world of language and human action.50 
The abject must be excluded if the individual is to preserve a 
sense of their own integrity. In the ageing female body we get a 
taste of how this process works. Ageing comes to all of us; it 
confronts all of us – male and female – with the imminence of 
death. How to resist? One method: locate ageing and the terror 
we feel in the bodies of older women. This method is by no 
means new; it is simply made more explicit by social media 
and broadcast technologies. To get a sense of the role women 
play in embodying the abject requires accessing the things 
ordinarily cast out and excluded from examination. Visual 
portrayals are particularly helpful for getting at that which is 
routinely ignored.51 
Two paintings by the Flemish artist Quentin Massys (1466–
1530) suggest something of the old woman cast as abject. In 
the Ugly Duchess (1513), Massys portrays an elderly woman 
in a low cut dress, more like an ape than a human being. Her 
skin is wrinkled, her ears and nose extended by age. Her lips 
curl over toothless gums in a leering smile, while her hair 
(what we can see of it) is thinning. If we are not revolted 
enough by this hideous depiction of a coy old woman, Massys 
repeats this theme in his Temptation of St Anthony (c. 1520–
4; painted with Joachim Patinir). Here, the contrast between 
the ugliness of the old woman and the beauty of the young 
woman is made explicit. As a trio of lovely maids tempt the 
saint with forbidden pleasures of succulent, youthful flesh, a 
laughing old hag hovers in the background, opening her 
neckline to reveal one of her breasts which is weathered and 
wrinkled and sprouting tufts of thick hair. 
In making his old women ape the actions and appearance 
of desirable young women, Massys draws upon a tradition 
of disgust with women who hide ‘their true appearance’ 
through the application of creams and potions.52  But this 
is also an image which reveals   all women, regardless of 
age, to be connected to the mutable and changeable 
processes of the natural world. The youthful maiden will 
one day be the aged crone. This is the terror that lies 
behind the disgust with the aged female body: but it is 
about more than just the female body. It is about the 
inevitable passing of Time that affects every single one of 
us. 
In Massys’ Temptation of St Anthony, the fear of sex 
leading the saint into sin meets something else in the form 
of the aged woman. Beneath the paint of the sensual 
young woman – and beneath  that of the dissembling 
older woman – is a skull. In the bone lying beneath 
desirable (and not-so-desirable) flesh, we find the source 
of the anxieties which accompany us through life. Contrary 
to the myths of immortality with which we like to endow 
our lives and our accomplishments, we are fragile 
creatures whose very existence is dependent on the 
processes of a world defined by change and decay. In the 
ageing body we come face-to-face with this reality, and with 
the inevitability of death. In the fear of the old woman, 
existential anxieties affecting us all take on a more 
manageable shape: they become her problem, not ours. 
While there are many examples in Western art of the 
ageing male body, it is seldom treated with the same level of 
disgust as that visited on the older woman.53 
Representations of elderly males are more often used to 
elicit sympathy than contempt. In Goya’s Two Old Men 
Eating (1820–3), one of the men is so cadaverous as to 
make one wonder if he is Death Itself, while the other, who 
appears to have no teeth, is trying to eat. This is a rather 
pitiful image, and it may make us fear for our own aged 
future. It does this, however, with pathos and compassion. 
We, too, will need the care of others. Mariano Fortuny’s 
Elderly Nude in the Sun (1871) is rather more upbeat, 
depicting an old man smiling contentedly as he warms his 
naked body in the sun; a hopeful view of what the latter 
part of life might be like. 
That the ageing female body is treated with disgust, fear and 
repulsion should give us pause. After all, all age and die, 
regardless of gender, wealth or status. Germaine Greer is onto 
something when she claims that Western society is 
‘anophobic’, a term she uses to describe the irrational fear of 
old women.54 There is something about women and age that 
stands apart from more general discussions of ‘human beings’ 
and ageing. This reflects, I suspect, the regular connection 
made between women and the natural world.55 The female 
body, its changes and cycles, has been routinely connected to 
the processes of sex and birth in a way in which the male body 
has not. Historically, women have been valued for their youth 
and fertility. When they cease to embody these virtues, there is 
no place for them. If women over the age of 40 have a 
superpower, it is invisibility (try ordering a drink at a bar).56 
No wonder women fear ‘the Coming of Age’.57 
Loss accompanies ageing, and we should not deny that. For 
women, menopause can be a difficult and painful time. It 
marks the end of the possibility of child-bearing, and for those 
of us who have not had children and who wanted them, this 
can feel like another failure, perhaps even a bereavement. 
These complex feelings meet a medical profession that 
constructs menopause principally as a disease, a dysfunction, 
a loss of health. It is possible to think differently about it. It 
can be something that is embraced, rather than feared. With 
the sadness that comes from recognizing that something is 
no longer possible can come something else; perhaps not quite 
the ‘positive life transition’ that some feminists would 
suggest,58 but something that holds out the possibilities of a 
new stage of life. As a young woman, I found the idea of the 
end of menstruation deeply disturbing. Hot flushes, mood 
swings, the end of fertility, the coming of age. All seemed 
terrifying, and I preferred not to think about their inevitability. 
Now the menopause is past, the sadness of not having 
children sits alongside a feeling of liberation. No longer do I 
have to spend money on tampons and pads. No longer do I 
have to try to remember when my period is due. The hot 
flushes I feared, when they came, felt like a burning away of 
that which was extraneous to my life. They left me with Bev as 
she really is, rather than Bev as she is viewed by others. 
Losses of this kind act as provocations for new ways of 
constructing a meaningful life. Feminist philosopher Pamela 
Sue Anderson suggests something of this in her work on 
vulnerability. When we experience loss, ‘we glimpse … the 
potential in vulnerability for transformation’ (Anderson 2017: 
10). There is pain and there is hope, and these feelings can 
sit side-by-side. We can think differently.59 The question is 
whether we are able to move beyond fear of such changes, 
and think again about where, precisely, the meaning of our 
transient lives should be located. 
Success, failure and the transience of life 
Tracing the gendering of success and failure should not 
lead to the conclusion that the habitual connection made 
between women and the physical world renders women’s 
priorities essentially different to those of men.60 My 
concern in investigating the use to which women’s bodies 
have been put is to expose the fears surrounding the 
mutable physical body. Connecting women with the 
supposed ‘failures’ of the body reveals more than just the 
limitations of an account of the meaningful life based 
around attainment and achievement. More importantly, it 
reveals how the ordinary losses that come with being 
mutable human animals have become read as forms of 
failure. When being subject to loss is constructed as failure, 
the natural processes of the physical world become 
problems to evade. Of course, the reality is that these 
processes cannot be avoided: they are the necessary 
features of a physical universe; they provide the context in 
which we must live out our lives. Ageing, decay and death 
are not features of life any of us can avoid; rather they 
bear witness to the human condition. Instead of framing 
this reality through the lens of failure, we would be better 
advised to see these physical processes as providing the 
necessary limits within which the human task of creating 
meaning is to be located. Beauvoir’s approach to old age in 
her later philosophy suggests the problem of denying limits 
in order to emphasize human striving.61 Like Sartre, she 
locates the creation of human individuality in a double 
movement. To become an individual requires being 
orientated to the future, and committed to meaningful 
projects. ‘The coming of age’ challenges the extent to 
which this approach can ever succeed. For the elderly, 
the future is limited; death is a present reality, rather than  
an  abstract  boundary  framing  the  context  for  choice  
and decision-making.62 
What old age reveals starkly is ‘the failure of all success.’ 
(Beauvoir [1970] 1996: 368) 
The actor, singer and icon Marlene Dietrich would have 
understood Beauvoir’s conclusion. In her forties, her faltering 
acting career was invigorated when she recreated herself as a 
singer, performing for Allied troops. Even as she revels in this 
new success, she fears it will not last: 
I’m afraid, period. A funny feeling. Fear of failing. Fear of 
having to give up, of being unable to endure this way of 
living. And everybody will say, with a smile, ‘Of course, 
of course, that was a silly idea.’ I can’t confide my fear 
to anyone. (Wieland 2015: 374) 
There is an anxious anticipation of failure that haunts even 
the most successful, precisely because success is never 
final in a world of chance and change. Viewed from the 
perspective of old age,  the anxiety that one’s achievements 
will not last seems far from ridiculous. 
Now for Beauvoir, recognizing the inevitable end of the 
achievements on which success depends is not particularly 
problematic. With Sartre, she accepts all life’s projects to be 
rendered ultimately absurd by death. This rather 
pessimistic conclusion raises the question of whether there 
could be an understanding of life that does not arrive at the 
conclusion that all life is meaningless if one’s achievements 
cannot be secured in any lasting way. Is there a different way 
of understanding the place of loss – and failure – in life? 
Beauvoir alludes to just such a possibility in the concluding 
remarks to her book on old age. Having noted the 
phenomenon of elderly politicians who cannot accept that 
their time is over – often with lamentable results – she 
comments that ‘if old age is not to be an absurd parody of 
our former life’ ([1970] 1996: 540), there is but one 
solution: 
In old age we should wish still to have passions strong 
enough to prevent us turning in upon ourselves. One’s 
life has value so long as one attributes value to the life 
of others, by means of love, friendship, indignation, 
compassion. (Beauvoir [1970] 1996: 540– 
1; my emphasis) 
Rather than emphasize the self and its projects, a subtle 
shift takes place. Now it is about locating one’s life 
alongside others: in love, relationship and political action. 
Reflection on ageing leads her to an understanding of life 
where projects still have their place, but where they are 
located more explicitly in the context of life with others.63 
Beauvoir’s words urge us to think again as to whether the 
categories of ‘success’ and ‘failure’ are the right ways of 
judging a meaningful life. Rather than ‘standing out from 
the world’ through identification with our projects, 
Beauvoir directs us to that which grounds us in the world, 
drawing attention to the relationships that form our sense 
of who we are. Far from the world being a problem for our 
identity, the world which surrounds us becomes the realm  
in which we discover the things that this world enables; 
and the four qualities Beauvoir suggests – love,  friendship,  
indignation and compassion – are all linked to our 
relationships with others. This grounded way of thinking 
affects the perspective taken on   the things that cannot be 
controlled. Conflating loss with failure might hold out the 
illusion of control over the things that cannot   be 
controlled: ageing, decay and death. But by making ageing 
a problem primarily for women, a proper engagement with 
loss and death is avoided. Excluding the ageing female body 
makes possible the denial of death, but at a price. 
Loss and failure are not the same. 
The notion of failure reflects a sense of responsibility for an 
outcome that could have been avoided. Loss, on the other 
hand, cannot be avoided, regardless of how careful we are, 
for its experience reflects the very nature of life. If I think of 
my childlessness, this is not a form of failure, even if, at times, 
I feel it as such. I am, rather, living with loss. That is painful, at 
times difficult. But accompanying that feeling of emptiness is 
something else: something that makes me want   to explore 
more deeply my place in a world which is not subject to 
human control; where the very processes that make it so 
beautiful are mysterious, beyond the human, and which 
therefore hold out a rather different way of thinking about 
the meaning of life than one which would locate it in a set of 
goals to be achieved or things to be accumulated. 
When women are blamed for failing to consistently embody a 
desirability based upon physical attributes, we get a glimpse 
of the way in which failure and loss become intertwined. And 
this muddling of the two suggests something more. When 
failure and loss are connected in the bodies of women a 
strategy is offered for controlling the reality of transient life. 
The ageing woman becomes the problem, not age itself. 
Tempting as this suggestion might be, it is, of course, 
impossible to follow through, for the fact is that in the midst 
of life we are all in death. No amount of cosmetic surgery 
will lessen that reality. No number of nubile young wives 
can hold that reality at bay forever. If the projection of 
ageing onto Woman cannot succeed at eradicating death, 
looking at ageing and death honestly and without fear 
must become central for thinking again about what it 
means to live well. When we hide from the ravages of 
Time, or project its effects onto others in order to escape 
the fears of our own mortality, we lose the ability to think 
seriously about what it means to be human in a world of 
chance and change. We avoid grappling with the existential 
anxiety which lies beneath the fears that hamper our 
ability to live well. 
If we refuse to run from the things that frighten us, we 
create the space for thinking differently about the meaning of 
our lives. Recognizing the reality of transience and 
dependence makes possible renewed engagement with 
the question of what it is to be human. Fixating on the 
striving, independent and resilient individual of 
neoliberalism does not make for an easy accommodation 
with such reflections. Paying attention to the experiences 
of illness and dying opens up better ways of living: as we 
shall see in the next chapter. 
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